History of US Intervention in Panama

From WolfWikis

"I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested."

-U.S. General Smedley Butler, 1933

1 Building the Canal
2 Continued Intervention
3 Conclusion
4 References
5 Links
6 Go Back to HI 453 Home

Building the Canal

Prior to its completion in 1914, the idea of building a Central American canal had been discussed in European and American circles for decades. Numerous private ventures had been attempted through the years, and at one point the US Congress even incorporated a company for such a purpose, though the effort ultimately failed.

In December 1898 imperialist president William McKinley addressed Congress. After announcing the annexation of Hawaii, he continued that it “[was] indispensable” a “maritime highway” be built connecting the two oceans. He claimed the completion of an American controlled canal in Latin America would increase commerce and make expansion into the Far East that much more tenable.

For this to be achieved, the British-American Clayton-Bulwar Treaty would have to be abrogated. The treaty, signed in 1850, declared that if the completion of a Latin waterway occurred, neither country should control it and both parties were forbidden from fortifying the passage. In a word, the canal’s “neutral[ity]” had been enshrined in the treaty. Although Britain at first expressed hostility to American offers (in particular US fortification of the area), due to British engagement in the Boers War and mounting tensions with Germany, the British agreed to US demands in 1901.

After the British turned over rights to the American government, the US government made Colombia an offer for control of the canal. The US would pay the Colombian government 10 million dollars and 250K a year, beginning nine years later, for rights to build and police a canal through the Colombian province of Panama. The Colombian Senate, based in Bogota, soundly refused the offered treaty and voted unanimously, 24 to 0, that the treaty not be ratified.

A furious Teddy Roosevelt (Roosevelt had taken over the presidency upon McKinley’s murder in 1901), responded to Colombia’s actions with racist diatribes. Amongst other things, he called Colombians “the contemptible little creatures in Bogotá.” He warned that if the treaty remained unratified the American government would take action that “every friend of Colombia would regret.” Roosevelt’s determination to build the canal proved so strong that in his original 1903 Message to Congress he advocated the seizure of the isthmus “without any further parlay with Colombia.” The suggestion, although struck from the final draft, demonstrated the length the US government would go to ensure access to a Latin canal.

While this drama played out at home, in Colombia plans were drawn up for the instigation of an uprising in the province of Panama. The planning for this revolution occurred in the offices of the Panama Railroad, a subsidiary of the New Panama Canal Company. Among the chief planners of the insurrection were the top engineer of the canal company, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, and William N. Cromwell, the company’s lead attorney. More importantly, the pair had contacted Roosevelt two months prior to the planned revolt. They had inquired as to whether the US military would intervene in the event of a revolution. Although Roosevelt claimed that the US had no foreknowledge of the event and no “part in preparing, inciting or encouraging the revolution,” the day before the revolt occurred the Navy had been sent to patrol both sides of the isthmus.

Once the revolt broke out on November 3rd, Philippe Bunau-Varilla proved instrumental in seeing it through. To begin, his money bought 500 mercenaries and 441 members of the fire department who engaged in the revolt. He then used his funds to buy off the Colombian officers who had arrived to suppress the insurrection. As a legal cover for US intervention, Roosevelt invoked an 1846 treaty that gave the US “the right of way or transit” across Panama. Roosevelt further claimed that the clause gave the US the legal right to prevent the Colombian army from repressing an internal revolt. Given this sort of manipulation and bribery, on November 4th, the revolutionary forces declared Panama a free republic. Roosevelt ordered immediate recognition of the new state and on November 13th he received the new minister of Panama, Philippe Bunau-Varilla. The two proceeded to negotiate a new treaty for the rights to the Panamanian canal. The new treaty, similar to the original one offered to Colombia, had the same financial obligations but allowed the US to fortify the land up to five miles on either side of the canal as opposed to the original three.^[1] Furthermore, the US ensured continued control through the inclusion of Article 136 in the Panamanian Constitution. It stated:

     The Government of the United States of America may intervene, in any part of the
     Republic of Panama, to reestablish peace and constitutional order, in the event of 
     their being disturbed, provided that the nation shall, by public treaty, assume or
     have assumed the obligation of guaranteeing the independence of this Republic.^[2]

Even the nationalistic historian Samuel Flagg Bemis concurred, "this, of course, made Panama a protectorate."^[3]

With Panama well situated in the American sphere of influence, the canal reached completion in 1914. In total, the project cost 400 million dollars. In 1920 the Congress did allocate 25 million dollars to Columbia, a pittance compared to the amount of revenue generated by the canal itself. ^[4]

Roosevelt had no qualms about his actions in Colombia. Writing later in his autobiography he declared, without any apparent irony, "Only the active interference of the United States had enabled [Colombia] to preserve so much as a semblance of sovereignty," prior to the "people of Panama declar[ing] their independence in November, 1903." Later on in his memoirs he responds to critics that questioned the legality of his actions, "Here again there was much accusation about my having acted in an ‘unconstitutional’ manner…which meant, that when nobody else could or would exercise efficient authority, I exercised it…" ^[5]

“I took the canal zone and let the Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the Canal does also.”

-Teddy Roosevelt, 1911

Continued Intervention

With the canal complete, there existed a need to ensure the free flow of ships and cargo. As Thomas Leonard writes,

      Washington's interest in Central America would increase after its decision to 
      construct a canal in Panama in 1903.  Political instability in Central
      America might spill over into Panama and the failure to meet foreign financial
      obligations invited foreign gunboats into the Caribbean.  In either instance,
      the security of the Panama Canal was threatened.

According to the logic of American policy planners, "political and financial stability in Central America prevented the spread of chaos to Panama and, at the same time, kept Europeans from intruding in the region."^[6]

To this end, Howard Zinn informs that no less than six interventions occurred in Panama from 1900 to 1933.^[7] Following is a brief and incomplete list of those interventions:

      * 1908 and 1912 - to maintain political stability
      * 1918 (June) - to ensure the smooth transition of political power
      * 1918 (July) - to put down a rebellion in Chiriqi Province
      * World War I - Navy protection to prevent Axis attack or use of the canal^[8]

Conclusion

The Panama Canal demonstrates a myriad of American objectives in the hemisphere: geopolitical consideration, easy access and easy flow of goods, use of force to maintain hegemony, racist rhetoric to justify that force, and the influence of capital upon the American government to influence imperialistic state policy. During the post-War period and continuing into the Cold War these objectives, while they may have operated under the cover of covert operations, were actually strengthened in many ways. Even after the Torrijos-Carter Treaty of 1977 that agreed to a date for return of the canal to Panama, US activity in Panama would again lead to armed intervention.

References

↑ Lens, Sidney, Forging of the American Empire, Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2003. Pgs. 198-202
↑ Baker, George W. Jr, "The Wilson Administration and Panama, 1913-1921," Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1966) Pg. 280
↑ Bemis, Samuel Flagg, "Development of the Panama Policy in the Caribbean and Central America (1902-1936)," in LaRosa and Mora, New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2007. Pg. 95
↑ Lens, Sidney, Forging of the American Empire, Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2003. Pg. 202
↑ Roosevelt, Theodore, "I Took Final Action in 1903" in Holden and Zolov, Latin America and the United States, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pg.93
↑ Leonard, Thomas M., "Search for Security: The United States in Central America in the Twentieth Century," The Americas, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Apr., 1991) Pg. 479.
↑ Zinn, Howard, A People's History of the United States, New York: HarperCollins, 1999. Pg. 408.
↑ Baker, 287-293