Neoliberalism and Social Revolution in Argentina

From WolfWikis

Argentina: A Neoliberal Success Story

By all neoliberal measures, Argentina’s economy at the turn of twenty-first century provided a success story in free trade: domestic markets were opened up, protective measures were brought down, and foreign capital flowed into the country. Yet, for the average Argentine, these supposed gains brought nothing but hardship and strife. In the ‘neoliberal decade’ of 1990-2000, the standard of living for the average middle and working class Argentine plummeted. According to government figures, from the years of 1991 to 1999 unemployment and underemployment doubled. Not surprisingly, during this same period, Argentines experienced a dramatic increase in social stratification. In 1990 the income of richest ten percent of Argentine society equaled fifteen times that of the poorest tenth. By 1999, the top ten percent had consolidated their income to twenty-three times that of the bottom tenth.^[1]

At the beginning of the decade, the Argentine state had become increasingly reliant on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pay off government debt and remain competitive in a globalized economy. In return for continued IMF support, the Argentine populace faced the iron hand of ‘structural adjustment programs.’ Under IMF dictates, Argentines were forced to endure severe cuts in social welfare programs, the neutralization of the country’s labor laws, and the nearly complete privatization of the Argentine state. In short, the role of government was reduced to merely ensuring Argentina remained a fertile ground for foreign investment.

Interested observers can view a year-by-year snapshot to trace this development. By 1993, for example, the effects of neo-liberalism were shooting violently throughout the Argentine economy. The “dismantling of financial regulations, along with tough anti-labor laws, wholesale privatizations and the pegging of the dollar to the peso” made Argentina particularly attractive to international capital. Foreign investors “prey[ed] on national services, land, [and] natural resources (oil) sold off by the government.”^[2] For this the Argentine state “was duly praised by the IMF and the USA.” However, instead of investment in infrastructure, “foreign capital was more interested in buying up industries if they could make profits by running them more efficiently – i.e. by sacking half the work force and making the other half work harder and more flexibly.” As a result, “the inflow of foreign capital tended to increase, rather than decrease, unemployment at the same time as depressing wages at the bottom of the labor market.” ^[3]

Argentina has long known deep class stratification. Yet, of the few mechanisms that existed for upward mobility, state employment offered one of the most direct and stable. As a result, union contracts in state-run industries offered many workers a secure middle class salary. Conversely, as public jobs were lost to structural adjustment programs, so too were the opportunities for Argentines to enjoy a middle class existence. To cite one particularly egregious example, between 1994 and 1995 YPF, the Argentine state oil company, underwent a rapid and thorough privatization. As a result, over 80% of its workers, starting with the most militant, faced lay-offs. The towns in which the oil company provided the bloodline of the local economy faced devastation. Poverty and crime spiraled upward. ^[4]

By the middle of the decade, the “wholesale impoverishment of the Argentine middle class” accounted for the “rapid and drastic proletarization of the majority” of the Argentine population. By December 1995, nearly one in five Argentines faced unemployment and another twenty percent, underemployment. Many workers held second jobs. Securing much fought after overtime provided the only means to make ends meet for many families. Medically, infant mortality increased to “rates unheard of since the 1930’s.” Diseases such as cholera, polio, and tuberculosis—not seen since the 1960’s—reached “epidemic proportions.” By 1997, the “social earthquake” of neoliberalism had reached staggering proportions. Only 5.7% of Argentineans earned more the $800 US dollars per month. One-third of Argentines brought home only between $3 and $163 in monthly wages. Worse still, 14.3% had no income to report whatsoever.^[5]

Neoliberalism took its toll on Argentina’s social institutions as well. Argentina’s universities, for example, had for over a century provided a high standard of tuition-free education. After 1991, many national universities began charging for attendance and administering entrance exams. The entrance exams, of course, favored the children of the rich who could afford private services in preparation. The introduction of tuition saw the number of university students drop twelve percent between 1992 and 1994. Predictably, this drop reflected a significant decrease in the number of working class and lower-middle class families who could afford to send their children to university.^[6]

As will be addressed, Argentine’s economic crisis brought about countless examples of solidarity, but, sociologically speaking, poverty and unemployment often exacerbate existing social problems. As Pablo Pozzi writes, “Though racism has always been a feature of Argentine society, recent research indicates that is has increased in the decade [between 1986 and 1996].”^[7]

In a period of recession, government response typically includes increased expenditure on social benefit programs. Yet, “the US dominated IMF has imposed the exact opposite policies on Argentina.” In order to secure new IMF loans, Argentina had to undergo further privatization, cuts in government social programs and public-sector wages, and an increased tax burdens on the middle-class and low-income workers.^[8] It should be noted, however, that IMF policies affected not only the Argentine populace, but the state itself. Neoliberal programs that stipulated the selling off and privatization of state industries actually led to an increase in foreign debt. In 1989, Argentina’s debt stood at 61 billion US dollars. In 1994, after selling off over 23 billion dollars worth of public assets, the national debt had increased to 73 billion dollars. In a word, all of this led to the entire Argentine economy becoming “transnationalized.” As such, subsidiaries of foreign multinationals account for eight of the ten largest corporations in Argentina. This holds true for nine of the ten largest banks as well. By 1995, Argentina’s politically centrist newspaper, Clarin, recorded foreign multinational involvement in six out of ten transactions inside Argentina.^[9]

Internally, a number of mechanisms account for Argentina’s transformation into a “Hood Robin State.”^[10] To quote Pablo Pozzi at length, “Hunger, unemployment, marginality, the impossibility of obtaining redress from elected representatives, and the lack of a viable justice system are the most immediate causes” of the social unrest that swept through Argentina in December 2001. “As James Petras (1994) has pointed out, this represents not the failure of [neoliberal] policies, but their success.” Instead of addressing issues of poverty and disenfranchisement, “the government has chosen to increase its security forces rather than modify any aspect of its social and economic policies.”^[11] Related, it should be noted that one sector of the Argentine state workforce did grow during the nineties—the security forces. By 1995, this sector accounted for sixty percent of state employment. In large part, the role of the military functioned domestically, namely, clearing away protestors who blockaded highways in cities throughout Argentina.^[12]

Scrutiny of government policy can illuminate the many ways in which implementation of neoliberal reforms dramatically affected the economic makeup of Argentine society. For example, one piece of Argentine legislation “enables investors to buy up a business without redress for former employees who are owed money.” According to Le Monde, the IMF “blackmailed the government into reintroducing this provision, known as a ‘cramdown,’ which has often encouraged the appearance of phantom buyers, acting as a cover for bosses greedy to repurchase their own companies for a song.”^[13] The Argentine legislature also repealed the Law of Economic Subversion, a key instrument in charging CEO’s with illegal capital flight. This occurred at the “explicit request” of the IMF.^[14]

By the early years of the new millennia, Argentina’s economy, far from improving, saw 2,000 Argentineans fall into poverty each day. Government response proved negligible, only more of the same. In July of 2001, wages in the public sector faced yet another round of cuts. Public pensions—raided to the tune of 3.5 billion US dollars to pay off national debt—were reduced by 13%. Yet, in December 2001 tensions would reach a critical mass and Argentina would see an explosion of popular consciousness. To quote the International Socialist Review, “Even in ‘good times,’ ‘neoliberal economies don’t create enough decent paying jobs to provide basic necessities.’ Thus there always exists pressure for raising or at least maintaining government spending on social services. The Argentine revolt has powerfully shown that social spending can be slashed only so far before a society explodes. By wrecking the lives of the working majority, neoliberalism digs its own grave.” ^[15]

Dec 19, 2001: “Que Se Vayan Todos”

So began the pot banging and sloganeering of the oppressed Argentine classes—“They all must go.” The frustrated masses of Argentina’s oppressed spoke to all facets of Neoliberalism within Argentina - the IMF, bankers, politicians as well as union and government bureaucrats. The enraged voices in the streets were speaking to the entirety of Argentina’s ruling class. In a way, the pot banging in the street began as a middle-class phenomenon. Indignant over the recent bank freeze, workers who had managed to keep their jobs or retain any savings in the bank, came into the streets to vent their frustration at a decade long slide into poverty. Rioting broke out, and that evening bank burnings and ransacking of grocery stores—“the direct appropriation of goods”—occurred in Buenos Aeries.^[16]

While the December 19th uprising marked a significant turn in the manner in which Argentines “challenged the International Monetary Fund’s stranglehold over Argentine society,” the voices in the streets must be understood in the context of a decade of grassroots organizing.^[17] Moreover, struggle should never be a static operation and the rebellion in Argentina proved anything but. New forms of social organization developed while the tried and true-methods of Argentine class struggle picked up new momentum. The next four sections will focus on evaluating the factors that laid the groundwork for the rebellion and discussing the new social forms that evolved.

Neighborhood Assemblies: Popular democracy in Argentina

After the December uprising some 200 popular assemblies cropped up in neighborhoods throughout Argentina.^[18] The assemblies, rightfully noted for their emphasis on direct democracy, provided a means to organize communities along horizontal lines. Within the assemblies, decision-making occurs by a show of hands and all individuals can freely suggest and discuss projects or strategies to carry on the struggle or improve the community. Much of the work of the neighborhood assemblies entailed meeting the everyday needs of residents. For this to occur, assemblies organized soup kitchens, bakeries, and “collective, self-reduction actions to reduce food prices.” Furthermore, groups were set up to resist evictions and “to illegally re-connect people cut off for non-payment of bills to public water and electricity supplies.” Many times this latter group included workers from the utility companies themselves. “The health committees of some 36 assemblies have made a written request to the government of Buenos Aeries proposing the committees participate or take over running of faltering hospitals.” In all these ways “the assemblies are being pushed by immediate everyday needs to develop radical practices which come into confrontation with the essence of capitalist social relations – the commodity form.”^[19]

Though their dramatic appearance in December 2001 can appear sudden to the outside observer, “the assemblies did not appear out of a vacuum.” Instead, they developed “out of a situation of material impoverishment and attendant disillusionment with politics.” The general election of October 2001 underlines this point: “22% of the (compulsory) ballot was blank or spoiled, whilst 26 of voters stayed at home.”^[20] In Buenos Aries, a plurality of voters spoiled their ballots. Fifty voters wishing to make a bit more drastic statement included an “unknown white powder” in their ballot envelope.^[21]

Critical observers should note that the neighborhood assemblies, for all their increased democratic participation, do not exist without contradictions. As Pablo Pozzi writes, “the people’s assembly was a form of popular democracy that contrasted favorably with the formal democracy promoted by the government.” Yet, “the control of the assembly remained firmly in the hands of the elite, politicians and notables.” So while the community assemblies “carried an implicit questioning of the political system” it did not entail “a break with the power structure.”^[22]

Piqueteros: ‘When the Reserve Army of Labor Refuses its Designated Role’

The Piqueteros—literally groups of unemployed ‘picketers’ who blocked streets to demand public works projects and relief funds—proved to be a key group in developing the social consciousness that facilitated the December 19th movement. Quite simply, the tactics of the piqueteros entailed organizing en masse and blocking main thoroughfares in Argentina. Accordingly, “traffic piles up, trucks can’t move, factories can’t get supplies. These are the functional equivalents of factory workers downing their tools. …Instead of directly stopping production, they stop the input and outputs from production.”^[23]

Yet, the militancy and democratic nature of the movement does not end there. Certain piquetero groups “eschew mediation, literally refusing to meet the state on its own terrain, forcing government negotiators to come to the pickets.”^[24] In this way, “their activity is about direct representation, direct negotiation, direct action.”^[25]

Observers note the Piqueteros for their diverse makeup. As James Petras informs, “in some areas unemployment is probably 50 to 60 percent. So many of the piqueteros are factory workers with trade union experience. Many are young people who’ve never had a job.” Yet, the most notable characteristic of the piqueteros involves the “preponderance of women” within them.^[26] Echoing this point, Z-Magazine puts the participation rates of women within the piqueteros at 65%^[27] As women play a leading role in the neighborhood assemblies as well, the social revolution in Argentina should be commended for its egalitarian nature.

To paraphrase the libertarian Marxist journal Aufheben, the promise and success of the piquetero movement lies in the fact that piqueteros, as unemployed workers, refuse to perform their designated duty as the reserve army of labor. This observation becomes especially relevant when piqueteros defend occupied factories or join neighborhood assemblies in their demands.^[28]

Organized Labor and General Strikes in Argentina: An Analysis

Much can be said, critically and otherwise, regarding the role of organized labor within Argentina. Argentine workers have a long history of labor militancy and according to James Petras, “general strikes are more common in Argentina than in any country in the world.” 2001 alone saw twelve general strikes^[29] Yet, these “ritual strikes of the trade union bureaucracy” are not as radical as they may at first seem.^[30]

To explore this situation, the 24-hour general strike of December 13, 2001—the largest and most successful prior to the December 20 uprising—provides an instructive example. The strike, called by Argentina’s three major labor federations, proved the most thorough Argentina experienced that year: transportation workers paralyzed movement within the country while protesters occupied government administrative offices and the state pension headquarters. Piqueteros blocked streets and railways in major cities. Yet, despite the widespread success of the action in shutting down the country and “decidedly antigovernment character” of the strike, the unions refused to continue the strike past the initial 24-hour period. In stymieing the momentum of the strike, “trade union officials abdicated any role they might have exercised and effectively sought to give the government a respite."^[31] The labor bureaucracy’s timidity existed part in parcel of a pattern that has gripped labor strife in modern Argentina: workers exhibit militancy in the face of class oppression. The labor unions, instead of providing a vehicle to mobilize this momentum, capitulate in the face of government pressure. To quote James Petras, the strikes “[are] decided from above, and they’re shut off from above.”^[32] In this manner, the unions exist merely as a ‘relief valve’ of class tension. This state of affairs not only prevents the radical undercurrents present in Argentine labor from surfacing, but allows for the containment of the labor movement to ensure a continuation of the status quo.

Reclaimed Factories: Democratic Control of the Workplace

“We formed the cooperative with the criteria of equal wages and making basic decisions by assembly; we are against the separation of manual and intellectual work; we want a rotation of positions and; above all, the ability to recall our elected leaders”^[33]

Argentina’s long economic deterioration, in conjunction with IMF dictates that left workers without basic rights, resulted in the shutting down of a large percentage of factories within the country. At one time, industrial workers made up 40% of the workforce. Today, that number rests below 20%.^[34] To once again paraphrase Aufheben, the mass worker of yesterday constitutes the mass unemployed worker of today.^[35] As a result, a factory reclamation movement took root.

In total, the movement has led to the occupation of 170 workplaces and has involved over 10,000 workers.^[36] According to the liberal-left French monthly Le Monde Dimplomatique, “such acts of ‘recovery’ are regarded as re-appropriations, for the public good, of places abandoned by ‘thieves’ in the private sector.”^[37] Put another way, “the recovered companies challenge capitalism’s most cherished ideal: the sanctity of private property.”^[38] Once a factory building has been recovered, many become more than that just co-operative economic enterprises; They come to encompass social centers and even schools. Two reasons account for this. One, a plain and simple wish to improve the community and, two, this allows for constant occupation and decreases the likelihood of police attempts at entering the factory.^[39]

Once operational, the workplace assembly becomes the place and manner in which the factory co-ops make decisions. In much the same way as the neighborhood assemblies, the factory assemblies stress direct democracy. Worker self-management has a profound impact on the individuals involved. To quote a reclaimed factory worker, “We’ve got to teach ourselves to be more than just workers, without turning into bosses.” Thus, “Free from bosses and managers, and driven more by pragmatism than ideology, the assemblies introduce equal pay and reassign responsibilities according to skill and experience.”^[40]

The role of politics in the reclamation movement deserves exploration. As sociologist Gabriel Fajn stresses, “There was a time when it was ideology, rather than the need to defend the right to work, that inspired the takeover of businesses.” As Le Monde notes, in this way ideology “seems to emerge as a consequence of the rescue process.”^[41] Of course, other options do present themselves. For example, numerous recovered factories, often under the influence of leftist parties, have demanded nationalization or ‘municipalization’ under worker control.^[42] Generally, though, reclaimed enterprises choose to remain autonomous of the state or political parties. As one astute observer records, “nationalization has shown itself to be a utopian goal under a state that, at best, shows contempt toward the movement.”^[43]

The ease at which the reclaimed factories become profitable provides one of the more striking elements of the movement. According to a 2005 article in Le Monde, nearly 80% of the recovered businesses have already become fiscally productive. First, workers implement mechanisms to ensure transparent accounting, something many of their old bosses neglected to do. Second, workers must find ways to overcome the problems they inherited from the old bosses as well as addressing the unique problems that affect reclaimed factories. Many of these exist entirely external to the factory floor. For example, suppliers often express suspicion at doing business with worker-managed enterprises. Moreover, according to the Argentine academic Andres Ruggeri, “multinationals don’t want to deal with cooperatives, and certainly not with salvaged businesses.” Third, the workers must balance distributing paychecks with business expenses and future investment. To pick an example at random, in one factory workers share 40% of the monthly profits, with the remainder being re-invested.^[44]

Ultimately though, the success of the worker co-ops in a global market economy speaks volumes about the nature of capitalism itself. The ease at which the worker-run enterprises—still responsible for bills, rent, upkeep, and overall expenses—become financially solvent demonstrates that labor costs and unruly workers do not account for unprofitable companies. In fact, the reverse holds true: employer costs and employer mismanagement bear responsibility for the wasteful nature of capitalist economic practices.^[45]

“An Experiment in Autonomous Resistance”

The successes of the people of Argentina would not have been achieved were it not been for the combined effort of all the aforementioned struggles. Another December 19th slogan—“Picket and pot-banger, the struggle is the same” (“Piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola”)—sums up the need for organization between groups that the ruling class would like nothing more than to pit against one another. This provides not only the necessary solidarity to achieve immediate aims, but allows movement groups to learn from one another. For example, the first roadblock—the standard tactic of the piqueteros—occurred during a 1997 teachers’ strike. Of course, Argentine history, rich in social struggle, demonstrates “a long tradition” of “struggles based on self-organization.” The three chronicled here—the piqueteros, neighborhood assemblies, and reclaimed factories—provide the most recent examples. Within the working class especially, there exists a “tradition of a struggle which does not stop at the factory gate but spreads throughout the town.”^[46] Once again, the struggles of the Argentine people over the last fifteen years embody this fact. The autonomy and the participant-directed, direct democratic nature of the struggle has enabled the movements to remain militant and adaptable. As James Petras reminds, “in none of these growing mass confrontations…has there been any organized vanguard.”^[47]

The Future

“The whole history of modern Argentina, of its changes in economic strategies and its various crises, is the history of the Argentine bourgeoisie’s battle to reimpose, again and again, capital’s control on a fierce, riotous proletariat.”^[48]

With an “insurrectionary movement in near permanent mobilization,” the struggles of the Argentine people provide a guiding light for all who oppose neoliberalism and hope to create a just economic system, free from the predatory imperatives of capitalism. As one Argentine government official complained, the IMF did not understand the constraint faced by government due to the nearly thirty actions a day inside Argentina^[49] In other words, “What makes Argentina such an inspiring place for social change is that radical change is being demanded completely outside of the realm of traditional electoral politics. …Argentina is a success story because movements are fighting against reformist measures” in the hopes of creating “a new life outside of systems that constantly put profit before people.”^[50]

Yet as Aufheben warns, “we must be careful not to fetishize the high points of the Argentine movement to the detriment of a more sober, wider perspective.” Many questions remain. Namely, will the middle classes still support a revolutionary program if the Argentine economy once again stabilizes? Will the worker co-ops be able to survive in a capitalist market? Can they still maintain their counter-capitalist position in light of this internal contradiction, or will “the law of value re-impose itself on the activities of the workers?” The role of organized labor can still go either way. Will labor unions cease to be merely a ‘relief valve’ for class tension or will they live up to their full potential in helping to usher in an era of industrial democracy? Of course, vigilance against co-optation need be ever-present. Argentineans must be careful to resist not only the populist rhetoric of the Peronists but the nationalist rhetoric of the left-parties which seek to subjugate this “riotous proletariat” under a new set of party bosses. Finally, the continuation of the struggle necessitates a clear understanding of the full workings of the capitalist system. A danger exists in Argentineans viewing capitalism not as a social relation between individuals and classes but only as a “rapacious exploitative class” that exists “outside the barrio.”^[51] Clearly, the future of the Argentina’s social revolution remains far from certain.

As Americans, we must ask ourselves one final question: why haven’t Argentina’s social movements provoked a stronger response from the US government or even minimal coverage in the US media? The explanation for this lies in the fact that successive Argentine governments, although often employing Peronist-populist rhetoric, have continued to abide by, and been subject to, dictates by the IMF. It will prove to be an interesting outcome of the popular movements if they force the government to entirely throw off the yolk of US-IMF domination. It will prove more volatile still if the autonomous movements succeed in bringing down Argentina’s capitalist state altogether. If this occurs, we can only imagine the struggle of Argentina’s proletariat, far from being over, will enter a new stage in which the people of Argentina will have to be prepared to defend themselves against all forms of aggression that will surely follow from the world’s most powerful capitalist nations.

External Links

National Movement of Reclaimed Factories (MNFR) [1]

Buy Direct from Argentina’s Worker Co-ops!!: [2]

Pretty Pamphlet detailing Argentina’s Social Revolution: [3]

The Take, a documentary film by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein, detailing the struggle of Argentina’s reclaimed factories: [4] [5]

Annotated Bibliography

A General Note on sources: Information on Argentina's social revolution proved incredibly hard to locate. Lack of coverage could be found not only in the mainstream American media, but in American Academic circles as well (with the notable exception of James Petras). As such, many of my sources are avowedly left-wing and originate outside of the US.

Aufheben: A collectively published British Libertarian Marxist journal. By far the most productive source I found in terms of analysis. An Aufheben archive can be found on the English Libertarian Communist site Libcom.org. [6]

International Socialist Review: A long running socialist monthly that has consistently retained a critical distance from any socialist or communist party. Highly respected journalism and political commentary. [7]

Le Monde Diplmatique: Liberal-Left French magazine. Only found one article, but it was far more in-depth than any coverage found in any American media outlet. [8]

Sin Patron by the Lavaca Collective: One of two published books on Argentina's uprising. (The other, which concentrates on the popular assemblies is Horizontalism by Maria Sitrin.) Originally published in Spanish, both books tell the story of Argentina's social revolution through the words of the participants themselves. Sin Patron, meaning "Without Bosses," was published by the left-wing Haymarket Books and concentrates on the reclaimed factory movement. Activist and author Naomi Klein helped write the forward. [9]

Z-Net: A very worthwhile resource if one hopes to delve further into the Argentinian revolution or any other contemporary social movement. Z-Net's most famous contributor is the dissident scholar Noam Chomsky. [10]

Latin American Perspectives: Radical Left Response to Global Impoverishment The only academic journal I found the had any in-depth analysis of the Argentine situation, but once again it was situated in the political spectrum of the radical left.

References

1. ↑ Aufheben #11 (2003). http://libcom.org/library/argentina-aufheben-11 Accessed on 11/25/07
2. ↑ In the Argentine land sell-off the liberal philanthropist George Soros bought 405,000 hectacres to become one of the largest landowners in Argentina. (Pozzi, 71)
3. ↑ Aufheben
4. ↑ Pozzi, Pablo. Popular Upheaval and Capitalist Transformation in Argentina. Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 27 No. 5, Radical Response to Global Impoverishment. (Sep., 2000) Pg. 63.
5. ↑ Pozzi, 73
6. ↑ Ibid, 75
7. ↑ Ibid, 76
8. ↑ Lewis, Tom. Argentina's Revolt. International Socialist Review, Issue 21, Jan.-Feb. 2002.http://www.isreview.org/issues/21/argentinas_revolt.shtml Accessed on 11/25/07
9. ↑ Pozzi, 70-72
10. ↑ The Lavaca Collective. Sin Patron. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2007. Pg. 23
11. ↑ Pozzi, 68
12. ↑ Pozzi, 84
13. ↑ Raimbeau, Cecile. Argentina: The Coops Dividend. Le Monde Diplomatique, Oct. 2005. http://mondediplo.com/2005/10/13survey Accessed on 11/25/07
14. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 35
15. ↑ Lewis
16. ↑ Aufheben
17. ↑ Lewis
18. ↑ Trigona, Marie. Argentines Making A Life After Capitalism. Z-Magazine Online, Apr. 2003, Vol. 16, No. 4. http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Apr2003/trigona0403.html Accessed on 11/25/07
19. ↑ Aufheben
20. ↑ Ibid
21. ↑ Lewis
22. ↑ Pozzi, 66-67
23. ↑ Petras, James (interview). Rebellion in Argentina: You Have to Take Power from Below. International Socialist Review, Issue 21, Jan.-Feb. 2002. http://www.isreview.org/issues/21/petras_interview.shtml Accessed on 11/25/07
24. ↑ Aufheben
25. ↑ Petras
26. ↑ Ibid
27. ↑ trigona
28. ↑ Aufheben
29. ↑ Aufheben
30. ↑ Petras
31. ↑ Lewis
32. ↑ Petras
33. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 8
34. ↑ Petras
35. ↑ Aufheben
36. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 8
37. ↑ Raimbeau
38. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 11
39. ↑ Ibid, 42
40. ↑ Raimbeau
41. ↑ ibid
42. ↑ Aufheben
43. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 39
44. ↑ Raimbeau
45. ↑ Lavaca Collective, 40
46. ↑ Aufheben
47. ↑ Petras
48. ↑ Aufheben
49. ↑ Ibid
50. ↑ Trigona
51. ↑ Aufheben

Globalizing Trade

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

Mercosur and CAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Zapatistas