The Invasion

From WolfWikis

Introduction

The Bay of Pigs invasion, or Operation Zepata was a failed operation. The breakdown occurred on many different levels. While much of the problem can be centered around the initial planning, there were other missteps along the way. For the most part however, many believe that this mission was doomed from the start.

Problems in Planning

To effectively overthrow Fidel Castro, a high level of action had to be taken on many different levels. "The essence of the plan, therefore, was a combination of guerrilla infiltration and psychological warfare. It would be complimented both by a program for economic pressures against Castro and by an effort to make the Organization of American States impose sanctions on Cuba."^[1] By putting on the economic pressures along with having a guerrilla force battling Castro in Cuba, the United States hoped to pressure Castro out of power in Cuba.

Having the guerrillas in Cuba was an important feature to the plan. Robert Kennedy said that "This was a very important factor in my mind and, I think, in the President’s—he said it can’t really be a failure, because once they land on the beach, even if as a military force they don’t win, they can always stay in Cuba and be Guerrillas." ^[1]Kennedy saw the Cubans being able to infiltrate Cuba and even without a direct victory in the campaign, he thought that the Cuban guerrillas would be able to cause Castro the same amount of trouble. The problem however, was the belief that 1500 men could be influential in overthrowing a man and in essence a government that was being supported by the Soviets.

Another problem in planning the invasion was the lack of organization within the government on planning the covert action. The basis for the attack was from a successful mission in Guatemala by a group called PBSUCCESS, however, their role in the Cuba operation was not as defined. "The special group, Bissel noted, always had an advisory role. After October 1960, its members were very much aware of their lame duck status, an so their role faded a lot. In fact, it had been quite minor throughout, and not only in the case of the Cuban operation."^[1] Planning for Operation Zepata started under the Eisenhower administration and carried over to the Kennedy administration. Also, having so many people involved caused people to question and overstep each other. "The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency’s failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it required—appropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, and full-time direction and control of the highest quality." ^[2]As can be seen with the lack of air support, "There was failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased judgment to the menacing situations that developed." ^[2]The C.I.A. and the rest of the governmental officials in charge of completing the Cuban operation were not able to adapt and come up with solutions to problems that occurred during the mission.

Some of those involved in planning the operation, including Jack Hawkins, Chief of the Paramilitary Staff of the Cuba Project, had problems with the size of the group of Cuban fighters. "In view of these rapidly growing capabilities, the Deputy Director for Plans at the CIA, Mr. Richard Bissell, decided that the planned infantry force of 200 to 300 would not be large enough; more like 1,500 men would be needed to establish a serious presence in Cuba. I expressed reservations about a force this large in view of the increased difficulties in recruiting, training, and providing support. However, President Eisenhower directed that preparations be made for a larger force."^[3]

Another problem in the initial planning was the need to be able to not have to take responsibility for the attack. As is with all covert actions, those involved need to be able to deny involvement. Again Jack Hawkins was very critical with leadership, especially President Kennedy and their effort to organize the attack. "President Kennedy emphasized that operations would have to be conducted in such a way that U.S. involvement could be plausibly deniable. This was the fundamental mistake underlying the other fatal errors that led to the failure of the operation."^[4] Hawkins felt that being able to deny the attack on America's behalf led to the later poor decisions made by Kennedy and the rest of those in charge with the operation.

The Lack Of Air Support

The major flaw in carrying out the attack on Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion was the lack of promised air support to the Cuban guerrillas. Chief of the Cuba Project, Jacob Esterline said, "What I am sure of is that we told Frente that there would be no overt U.S. overt military intervention until a viable provisional government had been established on the beach. We would establish the beachhead-it would give the US time to decide what to do. The unstated assumption was that once the beachhead was established, the US would have the pretext it needed to intervene on behalf of the Provisional government against the Communist Colossus. It was made abundantly clear to the Cubans that they could expect no help until they had established that piece of real estate."^[1] What the United States was hoping for was that the guerrillas would ultimately be successful in overtaking the Cuban national forces and then once the land was overtaken, then the Americans could ride in and give support to the guerrillas. The Americans were again looking for a way to make it look like they were involved if it was successful and not involved if it failed.

Some felt that the decision not to bring additional air support in was not the chief cause of failure. After the Inspector General looked into what went wrong with the attacks he wrote in his report, "In evaluating the Agency’s performance it is essential to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that the President’s order canceling the D-Day air strikes was the chief cause of the failure." ^[2]However,Jack Hawkins said, "Absolute control of the air was essential not only for the landing but also for further operations in Cuba. Our Cuban Brigade was small and could not be expected to undertake operations beyond its initial lodgement unless the strength of the opposing militia was seriously reduced by combat losses -- or by defection to our side. Many of the militia were of dubious loyalty to Castro and might well have turned against him had this operation been properly launched."^[5] Hawkins felt that if The United States was able to dominate this engagement and overpower the Cubans, then some of those whose loyalty to Castro was questionable at best might switch and help out with the American cause. Hawkins went on to say, "The training camp in Guatemala was located on the side of a remote volcano with very little level ground. Conditions there were extremely crowded and became health-threatening as additional recruits arrived. And from the airfield in Nicaragua chosen for tactical air operations, Cuba was just barely within range of the B-26 bombers procured by the CIA for the exile air force." ^[6]Even with air support, the location for the launch was not ideal for the attack.The air support was necessary for other things as well as for aide to the Cuban guerrillas. "Hence the Air strikes were vital-not to enable the 1400 Cubans to march from the beachhead to Havana, but to trigger US Intervention."^[1]

In his report again the Inspector General raises a good point however, "Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this underlying question: If the project had been better conceived, better organized, better staffed and better managed, would that precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential decision at all? And would it have been presented under the same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances?" ^[2]Some question whether or not the problems with the lack of air support come from the lack of good planning and organization within the infrastructure of the leadership.

Castro's Reactions

In a Memorandum drafted by CIA based on Comments made by Fidel Castro 14 and 15 June on the Invasion of 17 April 1961, the CIA discussed what went wrong with the attack based on what was said by Fidel Castro in response to the attack. Castro spent the bulk of the attack in a tank on the battlefield. He observed many different foul ups in the attack. 1. The airborne battalion was dropped in at points too close to the landing beaches. 2. The paratroopers did not engage the enemy until approximately 0800 on D-Day. Castro was mystified at the delay in entering into action. 3. The invaders did not know of certain special trails by which Castro had been able to infiltrate men in to the Cienaga de Zepata. 4. The invading forces fought very well as long as they thought they had air cover. After it failed, it was an easy matter to get them to surrender.^[7] Castro even had his own opinion as to how the attack should have been undergone. He said, "Right here I would have used four or five of the 75 mm. anti tank guns if I had been an invader. I also would have used a couple of their 81 mm. (4.2 in.) mortars, and the paratroopers, with the 75 mm. anti-tank guns and the mortars could have controlled this entrance, which is where we came through. I could, in the invaders position, have held the place, and at this particular place it would have been almost impossible for us to flank them.”^[7] Castro believed that the timing (the paratrooper attack occurring late in the mission)and his knowledge of the attack allowed him to be better prepared to defend the attack. Also, he felt that the lack of air cover and support, like many others felt, was the ultimate cause of demise for the Cuban guerrillas.

One of the main problems was that can be seen in Castro's own reactions is that he not only expected action from The United States of America, but also that he was taking many precautions for its imminent date. "It was less than fully rational to assume that a plan that had worked in Guatemala would meet with equal success in Cuba. Castro had over 200000 men in arms and the Guatemalan precedent. He therefore expected an American-sponsored coup and took numerous precautions."^[8] Castro saw how operations were run with PBSUCCESS in Guatemala and used that as a base to prepare his defense if and when the same action were to be done to him in Cuba.

Responses To The Failed Attack

"The lesson Kennedy drew from the Bay of Pigs was not that he should talk to Castro, but that he should intensify his efforts to overthrow him."^[1]. Kennedy and the rest of the administration knew that this was a point that they could not turn back on the Cuba situation. The world knew the result of the failed covert action and the cards were on the table. "Nor was it rational, no matter how elaborate the deceit, to expect that the United States could deny involvement in the invasion and escape international censure." It would have been hard to conceal who was actually behind the attack like Kennedy wanted.

What is sometimes forgotten in the fallout of the Bay of Pigs disaster was the outcome of the Cuban guerrillas who were fighting for the U.S. government. Most of the 1500 men involved in the attack were either captured and/or killed. Robert Kennedy's theory that these men could infiltrate Cuba even if the initial attack failed was not correct. The United States government left those men hanging, as is the case in many covert actions that fail. Jack Hawkins relayed that, "The last message from Jose Pepe San Roman, the Brigade Commander, was, ``How can you people do this to us?" ^[9]In essence, the Cubans were betrayed by the people who said they would be supported if things got bad in Cuba.

References

Annotated Bibliography

  1. Gleijeses, Piero, "Ships in the Night:The CIA,The White House and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies: Vol. 27, no. 1,1995, pg. 5

Gleijeses is able to chronicle the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion from its planning stages during the Eisenhower administration to the attempted attack and the repercussions that followed. He uses primary source quotes from people who were directly involved in the operation.

  2. "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation" October 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States

In the Inspector General's report on the Cuban Operation, one can find recently released, documentation of the evaluation of what went wrong in Operation Zepata.

  3. ↑ Hawkins, Jack,"Classified Disaster" National Review, 00280038, 12/31/1996, Vol. 48, Issue 25

Hawkins breaks his silence in his article in the National Review 35 years after he was directly involved in the Bay of Pigs operation. He critiques the decision making of those in charge and shares his discontent of how the operation was run.

  4. ↑ 7.0 7.1 National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, A Item 8, accessed from Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1961-63, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-62

A memorandum from the Department of State in response to remarks made by Fidel Castro two months after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

  5. ↑ Vanderbroucke, Lucien S. “Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99 no. 3, fall 1984, 473.

Vanderbroucke looks at the politics behind the Bay of Pigs failure. The article chronicles the mistakes made by the government before and during the operation.