The Prelude

From WolfWikis

Covert Actions in Latin America: The Bay of Pigs Invasion

Introduction On April 17, 1961 a brigade of 1300 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs as part of an amphibious assault and invasion of the island.^[1] These men had been trained, equipped and encouraged by the CIA under the auspices of two American presidents. This invasion failed and led to dire consequences both for the guerrilla fighters as well as Cuban-American relations. It has been called John F. Kennedy’s “worst hour”.^[1] The Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba is just one link in a chain of United States covert actions in Latin America. However unlike many other American adventures, the Bay of Pigs incident is most noteworthy for its failure, the follies of American leadership and the consequences of the doomed invasion.

Eisenhower’s Involvement

As early as January 14, 1960 the United States government decided to take steps that would led to the downfall of the Fidel Castro government in Cuba. The Cold War and the belief in containment led Eisenhower and other Cold Warriors to see Cuba as a threat, especially as Castro turned more and more toward the Eastern bloc.^[2] Edward Cuddy wrote, “Castro’s firebrand anti-Americanism, his expropriation of American corporations, his growing ties with Cuban Communists inflamed the growing conflict between the two countries.”^[3] At a National Security Council Meeting on that date Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom presented a report in which he wrote that a program had been approved that “authorized us to support elements in Cuba opposed to the Castro governments while making Castro’s downfall seem to be the results of his own mistakes.”^[4] President Eisenhower authorized the formation of a CIA task force called WH/4 or the Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division.^[5] WH/4 was headed up by the Chief of the Branch, Jack Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins.^[6] The purpose of WH/4 was to organize a plan of covert action against the Castro government and the task force received presidential approval on March 17, 1960.^[7] The taskforce quickly developed a plan that was a combination of “guerrilla infiltration and psychological warfare.”^[8] In addition to these more covert methods the United States applied economic pressures to Cuba and tried to convince the Organization of American States to place sanctions. The United States hoped to employ many of the same methods that it had used in the coup against President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954.^[9]

Guatemalan Deja vu

As part of the plan of action for Cuba the CIA also reestablished a radio station on the small Greater Swan Island that was almost 100 miles off the coast of Honduras.^[10] This tactic was similar to the one that they had used during their role in the coup against President Arbenz of Guatemala. The CIA had used the station on Greater Swan Island to deliver propaganda messages against President Arbenz to the people of Guatemala and the CIA planned on doing the same thing in Cuba. The CIA also planned to drop leaflets encouraging uprising just like they had done before in Guatemala in 1954.These were some of the many similarities between the Cuba situation and the historical precedent that the CIA saw in Guatemala. Historian Piero Gleijeses has pointed out other similarities between the circumstance between Guatemala and Cuba. Gleijeses wrote, “The similarities between the Guatemalan and the Cuban operations went beyond the selection of the native leadership. From an institutional point of view as well the parallels are striking.”^[11] Like in Guatemala the United States hoped to orchestrate an ouster of a left leaning leader and yet appear to have little to do with it. The CIA success in Guatemala provided them with a blueprint as to how to pursue other problems in Latin America. Eisenhower was very concerned with military spending and the pattern of covert action the CIA had developed in Guatemala seemed to be a cheap way of implementing policy.^[12] Historian Lucien Vandenbroucke wrote, “”CIA officials repeatedly referred to the precedent while preparing the Bay of Pigs. The agency assigned many of the operatives involved in the Guatemalan coup to the Cuba project and envisioned a similar type of psychological warfare.”^[13] Unfortunately for the CIA, Castro had learned from the Guatemalan precedent and took numerous precautions. For example he had purged the Cuban army so that it was full of men personally loyal to him. This prevented him from falling the same way that Arbenz had when the Guatemalan army refused to fight on his behalf, fearing American retaliation.^[14] Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff Michael Warner wrote, “Fidel Castro had drawn his own lesson from the Guatemala operation, and he was determined to leave no opening for the sort of chaos the PBSUCCESS had exploited.”^[15]

The Plan Changes

Initially the CIA trained 300 Cuban guerrillas in the Canal Zone and later in Guatemala. By the summer of 1960 the concept of the guerrilla forced began to change from the initial vision of a small insurgency force to the concept of a broader amphibious assault unit. The CIA felt that a small insurgency movement would not produce the spark needed to ignite a wider revolt against Castro in the populace of Cuba. The CIA began to believe that a larger force would produce the psychological effect that would rally the Cuban people to the side of the invaders. This fact coupled with the poor performance of the rebel groups that were in Cuba, prompted the switch in plans.^[16] Eisenhower approved of this switch in tactical thinking but before the plan was finished Eisenhower was out of office and John F. Kennedy was the President.

Kennedy’s Involvement

During his campaign for the Presidency Kennedy was briefed on the proposed plans for an invasion of Cuba. On November 18, 1960 President-elect Kennedy was brought up to date with the planning of the Castro’s removal. Kennedy offered no objections to the invasion at this time.^[17] Kennedy believed that the United States had the right to overthrow Castro, a communist leader within the Western Hemisphere. Kennedy did have reservations about the plan the CIA presented him however. He was unsure about the possibility of the success of the plan. But there were additional factors that put the new President into a position that he saw little choice but to go along with the plan as it was presented.^[18] Kennedy faced political pressures from the Republican Party and feared being accused of being soft on Communism. Kennedy democratic predecessor Truman had suffered such attacks when he “lost China”. During his Presidential campaign Kennedy had stressed Cuba as an issue and the president worried about a potential backlash if failed to address the problem. Vandenbroucke wrote, “But perhaps the single most important reason behind his decision was the desire to avoid domestic criticism on the issue of communism.”^[19] President Kennedy had won the election on the narrowest of margins and he was very conscious of being politically vulnerable. The plan was very popular with the President’s advisors as well. As Dean Rusk wrote, “Every single one of his advisors, me included, recommended it.”^[20] Additionally the President felt pressure from the American populace that saw a communist country so close to their borders as a real security threat. There was strong public sentiment for the President to take action against Castro. This was coupled with the fact that the invasion plan had been so long in motion that by the time that Kennedy came to power the Bay of Pigs invasion plan had a momentum of its own.^[21] Kennedy heard very few dissenting voices against the plan that the CIA had presented. The military felt that the operation was not under its direct jurisdiction and so choose to consent to the plan. General Lemnitzer of the Joints Chiefs of Staff said that the military was not more vocal with its concerns about the plan the CIA presented because, “It was not our operation.”^[22] The military did not raise its concerns about the Bay of Pigs invasion plan to the President. Additionally the military did not dissent because as General Lemnitzer said, “There were all kinds of difficulties in the world at that time and the operation was far from being a high priority.”^[23] There were also personal motivations involved that led some to push for the invasion. For example Deputy Director of the CIA Bissell who was hoping that a successful operation could lead him directly into Director Dulles’s job.^[24] In 1997 Jack Hawkins broke years of silence and discussed the Bay of Pigs. Hawkins placed some of the blame on the Presidents advisors such as Dean Rusk and others in the State Department. Hawkins said, “Throughout the planning the President more often than not adopted the positions taken by the Department of State.” Hawkins goes on to blame Rusk for key changes in the plan that led to disaster.^[25] The president also had problems with the alternatives that the CIA presented him to invasion. The CIA claimed that Castro was about to get a massive shipment of arms from the Soviets. This created a timing problem for the Americans. As Vandenbroucke described the CIA also presented the President with a “disposal problem.” The United States would have to do something with all of the exiles training to retake their country. If the United States called off the invasion, the administration feared that these disgruntled guerrillas would “spread the word that the United States had backed off.” This troubled President Kennedy who worried about looking weak to the Soviets.^[26]

The Plan Changes…Again

All of the above factors led the President to go along with the planned invasion of Cuba. But President Kennedy did insist on several crucial changes. The President insisted that the landing site of the invasion be changed. He scaled down and limited the American air strikes that supported the invasion. Many in the CIA believed that if the attack went sour the President would overtly intervene to save the invasion using the American military. This proved to be a misconception. This and other errors led to the invasion failing.

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