US Perspectives on the Cuban Revolution

From WolfWikis

The Cuban Revolution and rise to power of Fidel Castro in 1959 reflected the Cold War policy of the United States toward the world-at-large. The US Government's overriding concern for security against communism and instability in the third world drew its attention away from the problems that members of the State Department had with him and his movement. Two opposing views within the State Department emerged during the Cuban Revolution. One side, espoused by US diplomats who actually spent time in Cuba favored continued support for the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in light of its apparant stability and anti-Communist sentiment. The other view, generally held by diplomats in Washington, favored support of left-wing Castro. The breakdown in official opinion generally went along these lines: "Those in the economic field were pro-Batista because they were dealing with American business. Those in the political section and the intelligence section were pro-revolutionary. We could say for humanitarian reasons, or whatever the reasons may be." Smith in Gardner Testimony p.48

Fulgencio Batista: "Our Guy in Cuba"

Despite his possible human rights abuses and clearly dictatoral regime, Arthur Gardner said to the Congressional Subcommittee to Investigate the National Security Act in 1960 that, "Batista had always leaned toward the United States. I don't think we ever had a better friend. It was regrettable, like all South Americans, that he was known-although I had no absolute knowledge of it-to be getting a cut, I think is the word for it, in almost all the, things that were done. But, on the other hand, he was doing an amazing job." Gardner Testimony p.6

The positives of having Batista in power included more than just a stable anti-Communist government: "There were three forces that kept Batista in power. He had the support of the armed forces, he had support of the labor leaders. Cuba enjoyed a good economy. Nineteen hundred and fifty-seven was one of the best years in the economic history of Cuba." Smith in Gardner Testimony p.43

Gardner reported positively on the situation of Batista in Cuba to the State Department in 1956: "People enjoying high-level prosperity for Cuba and in general politically apathetic. Opposition disunited, and there no evidence insurrectionary groups have large following within country. Government displays utmost confidence and proceeding methodically with plans for elections 1957 and 1958." The Castro threat seemed minimal and Batista to be the best bet for stability in Cuba. Gardner Correspondence p.1

Batista appeared to be on board with US programs to halt communism in Latin America. A CIA official charged with visiting Cuba in 1956 reported that Batista responded favorably to the US' BRAC program, or Buro para la represion de las actividades comunistas (Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities): "Upon my return to Washington five weeks later, a fairly detailed report from Havana indicated that Batista appeared to be following to a letter all of the suggestions that had been made." Kirkpatrick book p.5

During the first two years of the Revolution the US Government continued its military and economic support of the Batista regime. Gardner reported to Congress that "I know he had the cash to pay for them. And I know that the mutual aid pact, which represented a contract which we made with many Latin American countries, enabled us to dispose of second hand military equipment, tanks, guns, and everything else, which we could never use. And that in return for it, that we set up in each of the countries that signed this pact an Army, an Air Force, and a Navy commission, let's call it-I mean men there to train them and get them to use it." Gardner Testimony p.14

Fulgencio Batista: Violent Dictator

Gardner's assertion of Batista's use as a strong anti-Communist went unheeded by many "fourth floor" State Department officials. Secretary of State Robert Murphy "felt so strongly against Batista, that anybody would have been better, I imagine, is the way he would put it." Gardner Testimony p.8

Murphy and officials in Washington opposed Batista's negative record on human rights, including alleged instances of torture and violence to suppress dissenters and a free press. Members of the State Department in Washington considered Batista to be "a rightist ruthless dictator whom he (Herbert Matthews) believed to be corrupt." Gardner Testimony p.29

The situation in Cuba seemingly deteriorated by 1958 as Castro's strength grew. A veteran CIA offical visiting Cuba noted the increase in barbarous acts committed by government forces and provided one shocking example: "I was skeptical, as my friends had known I would be. They had brought pictures to prove it. These photographs had been taken by a doctor of a woman who had come to him for treatment. She was a schoolteacher and had been arrested with one of her male students on suspicion of plotting against the government. They were taken by the police to a prison where they had been tortured. She had been severely beaten and he had been pounded into unconsciousness. They had been released because the teacher's sister fortunately had friends in high enough positions in the government to open the prison doors. The doctor who treated the woman said he had never seen a human body more mistreated. He had taken the pictures, with her permission, because there were still some who did not believe or realize what was going on. The horrible wounds on the woman's body were convincing, as were the reports of case after case of the sons of prominent Cuban families who had joined either the students' organization or the July 26 movement and had been arrested and killed." He continues, "It was this type of atrocity that was costing Batista the last of his support among the people of Cuba." Kirkpatrick book p.7

Supported by onetime Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs Roy Richard Rubottom and other State Department officials, the US Government halted US arms shipments to Batista in May 1958. Ambassador Gardner told Congress the common gossip that "Rubottom was the only man who could have stopped it." Gardner Testimony p.14 Official documents show that State Department officials justified their decision by saying pointing out opposition to Batista within Cuba: "There is considerable opposition within Cuba to Batista, who obtained power through a military coup and rigged elections. Batista probably does not command the support of a majority of the Cuban people today. He promised free elections in June but had not convinced the people that they would in fact be free and has recently imposed very severe restrictions and abrogations of civil rights. In addition to internal problems in Cuba, there is considerable Congressional and public sentiment in the U.S. opposed to shipment of arms to Batista." Suspension of Arms Shipments p.1

Rubottom's reasoning for halting arms shipments to Batista could have been influenced by Castro: "Castro made a howl about Batista getting these arms to kill Cubans. I mean it was a lopsided idea. Castro didn't mind getting them to kill other Cubans, but he didn't want Batista. But he had the airways, and he was able to tell people that. He screamed about it. "

The American betrayal of Batista discouraged him and led partially to his downfall and exit from Cuba in 1959. According to Gardner, "“Well, I used the expression before that Batista felt the rug had been pulled out, and that in having a proper election, and with a proper candidate, which is what we had all hoped he would have, that he had lost all interest, and apparently at that stage was to leave. I mean he figured there wasn't any hope for him.” Gardner Testimony p.9

Even high-level members of the Defense Department, such as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, questioned the decision to pull out of a "vaild contract with a free government." Burke commented that "there are a number of dictators in Latin America and said that there might be considerable difficulty if Latin American countries felt they could not rely on the U.S. to carry out valid contracts for shipment of arms. These countries would only look elsewhere for military equipment." Suspension of Arms Shipments p.1

Ambassador Earl T. Smith, although he did not welcome Castro, held the view that the Batista regime failed from a combination of internal problems and US pressure: "However, the Batista regime was disintegrating from within. It was becoming more corrupt, and as a result, was losing strength. The Castro forces themselves never won a military victory. The best military victory they ever won was through capturing Cuban guardhouses and military skirmishes, but they never actually won a military victory. The Batista government was overthrown because of the corruption, disintegration from within, and because of the United States and the various agencies of the United States who directly and indirectly aided the overthrow of the Batista government and brought into power Fidel Castro. "

Fidel Castro: Democratic Revolutionary

Roy Richard Rubottom, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs in 1959 and later Ambassador to Argentina, worked alongside Robert Murphy to increase support for Castro within the State Department and improve his standing with the American public. According to Arthur Gardner, "He favored Castro. There is no question about it." Gardner protested privately to Castro's state-sanctioned visit to the US in 1958: "the State Department announced publicly that Castro would be welcomed as a distinguished leader, and would he given an official security guard if necessary, even though his visit was unofficial."

Although illegal, the US Government usually sanctioned or at least looked the other way when private firms shipped arms to Castro. Arthur Gardner believed that the US allowed Castro to receive arms while denying the same to Batista.

The writings of journalist Herbert Matthews of the New York Times praising Castro's revolutionary forces influenced inexpierenced State Department officials such as Rubottom to support his cause. Matthews praised Castro as a democratic counter to the dictator Batista. Matthews reported, "He has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections." Castro assured Matthews that "You can be sure we have no animosity toward the United States and the American people" Matthews Report p.8

Matthews "made Castro appear to he a Robin Hood, a savior for the country." Gardner Testimony p.9 The State Department went so far as to charge Matthews, who according to Gardner did not possess expertise on Latin American affairs or "any affairs" for that matter, with briefing incoming ambassador Earl T. Smith on the Cuban situation upon his coming to office.

According to Smith, the reason for the US Government's action concerning Castro may have not been reasoning at all, but simply unwillingness to face the truth: "I think that Roy Rubottom was under terrific pressure from segments of the press, from certain Members of Congress, from the avalanche of Castro sympathizers and revolutionary sympathizers who daily descended upon the State Department, also their official representative, Betancourt, and Rubottom may have taken the line of least resistance."Gardner Testimony p.38

Fidel Castro: Communist

CIA officials remained ambivalent and unsure of Castro's communist activities. According to one, "It was known that there were some Communists with him in the Sierra Maestra Mountains." However, as of 1958, "It was hard to determine how many of Castro's hard-core guerrillas were Communists, or how powerful were the Communists in the July 26 movement. Castro had been known as a revolutionary since his student days at the University of Havana and had achieved notoriety for his unsuccessful attack on the Army barracks at Moncada on July 26, 1953, the date for which his movement was named. But we were not sure whether he was an avowed Communist." Kirkpatrick book p.7-8

Arthur Gardner maintained his position that Fidel Castro would do more harm than good if allowed to take power in Cuba. The Batista dictatorship would be preferable to Castro: “Well, I saw a manifesto that he had printed in Mexico, which stated his principles, what he was going to do. He was going to take over the American industries, he was going to nationalize everything. I mean I don't remember the words of this particular manifesto. I have a copy of it in Washington. That, to me, meant only one thing, that this man was a radical.” Gardner Testimony p.15

Ambassador Earl T. Smith came to share Gardner's negative assessment of Castro. Smith wrote to Washington that Castro "was a Marxist" and because of that "it was perfectly obvious to me as it would be to any other reasonable man that Castro was not the answer; that if Castro came to power, it would not be in the best interests of Cuba or in the best interests of the United States." Gardner Testimony p.37

Smith remained critical of State Department actions as bringing him to power. He testified before Congress in 1960 that the State Department, and other government agencies, brought Castro to power without awareness of his intentons: "The American Government, yes, sir, and the people in the American Government." Gardner Testimony p.36 Smith went so far as to name those individuals with influence on the State Department: "Many of these people, who later became members of the first Cabinet of Castro were asylees in the United States. They had close contacts with members of the State Department. To name a few: Urrutia, the first President of Cuba, Agramonte, the first Foreign Minister of Cuba, the first Prime Minister of Cuba, Miro Cardona. As a matter of fact, the first time that I met Cardona was after Batista had left the country. It was about the 4th of January of 1959 in the Presidential palace. He turned to me and said ' "I am a good friend of (State Department official) William Wieland, a very good friend of William Wieland." Also, many other revolutionary sympathizers had access to the State Department. These people brought continual pressure on the Department."

Smith even named members of the State Department within his own Embassy who supported Castro: "I would say the Chief of the Political Section, John Topping, and the Chief of the CIA Section. It was revealed that the No. 2 CIA man in the embassy had given unwarranted and undue encouragement to the revolutionaries. This came out in the trials of naval officers after the Cienfuegos revolution of September 1957." Gardner Testimony p.42

The rest of the State Department eventually realized Gardner's fears of a massive nationalization program and loss of US business interests following Castro's ascension to power. The moderates in Casto's government quickly yielded to the more leftist elements: "When Castro took over the government of Cuba the Communists, already strong in his movement, went to work in earnest, taking over the key spots. The moderates who dominated his early government were gradually forced out or, repelled by his measures, left. By 1960 Cuba was in all respects a Communist country." Kirkpatrick book p.14

Conclusion

The State Department's uncertainty and disagreement over who to support in the Cuban Revolution serves as yet another example of the pattern described by Robert Pastor. He based his analysis of US policy in Nicaragua and the Sandinistas partly on Batista/Castro in Cuba. The US could not decide on who to support and switched sides seemingly on a whim. The Cubans lost trust in the US as faithful allies and spawned anti-American sentiment, setting the pattern for future US policy in Latin America.

Annotated Bibliography--US Perspectives on Cuban Revolution

HTTP://WWW.LATINAMERICANSTUDIES.ORG [1]; a fantastic source for primary documents relating to the Cuban Revolution and US-Latin American relations in general.

1. "COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN," HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, PART 9 ,AUGUST 27, 30, 1960. United States Government Printing Office, Washington: 1960. Accessed 24 July 2007, at [2].

The main source for my research. Testimony of former ambassadors to Cuba before the Senate only a short time after their terms ended. Interesting to see how the politics of the State Department played out internally.

2. Gardner, Arthur. Personal correspondence. From Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-1656. 16 October 1956. Accessed 24 July 2007 at [3].

Gardner's telegrams in the wake of Castro's arrival on scene.

3. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. The Real CIA. Ch. 7 "Batista's Cuba." New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968. Accesed 24 July 2007 at [4].

Book written less than a decade after the Revolution by former CIA agent. Provides insight of US involvement.

4. Matthews, Herbert L. "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout: Castro is Still Alive and Fighting in Mountains." New York Times: New York, 24 February 1957. Accessed 24 July 2007 at [5].

Herbert Matthews' watershed report on Castro's survival. Some argued that it changed world opinion in favor of Castro.

5. "SUSPENSION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA," MEMORANDUM OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING, PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC, 2 MAY 1958. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STATE-JCS MEETINGS: LOT 61 D 417, MAY 1958. Accessed 24 July 2007 at [6].

Another government document showing dissention of opinion about Cuban policy.

6. <http://youtube.com/watch?v=o5b8aX9gKOI&mode=related&search=> Newsreel from 1959 providing a good contemporary overview of the Revolution. American media still portrayed Castro as a hero.

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